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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
I.

BANKRUPTCY

The Homestead Exemption: Virginia'sNew
Exemption for Personal Injury Claims

In 1978 Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act (the Act).' Under
the Act, the filing of a bankruptcy petition creates an estate consisting of all
property of the debtor. 2 Chapter 7 of the Act calls for discharge of the
debtor's debts following liquidation of the bankruptcy estate and disburse-

ment of the liquidation proceeds to creditors. 3 To effectuate the long-standing
bankruptcy policy of providing debtors with the opportunity for meaningful
fresh start, the Act allows debtors to claim certain property as exempt 4 from

1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as the Act]. Congress initiated the process
of bankruptcy reform in 1970 by creating the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States to analyze and recommend changes in bankruptcy law. Act of July 24, 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970). The commission recognized the function of bankruptcy
as providing debtors with relief from debt to effectuate a meaningful fresh start while protecting
the position of creditors in an open credit economy. REPORT OF THE COImSSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. pt. I at
71 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ComanssioN REPORT]; see Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,
244 (1934) (goal of bankruptcy is to provide debtor new opportunity in life free from burden
of pre-existing debt). The Commission developed a list of federal exemptions for use in
bankruptcy to eliminate the use of diverse and generally archaic state law exemptions. CoMmsSION REPORT, supra, pt. II at 127; see 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
522.21 at 522-68 (15th ed.
1979) (wide disparity among states in nature and value of exemptions). The final version of the
Senate bill allowed debtors to claim both federal nonbankruptcy exemptions and the exemptions
of the debtor's state. S. 2366, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 522 (1977). The final version of the
House bill allowed debtors the choice of either a list of federal bankruptcy exemptions or the
exemptions of the debtor's state. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The Act as passed,
by allowing states to opt out of the federal plan and restrict debtors to state and federal
nonbankruptcy exemptions, represents a compromise between the House and the Senate on the
exemption provisions. 124 CONG. REc. 32,398 (STATEMENT OF REP. DON EDWARDS), reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6452-53; 124 CONG. REc. 33,998 (STATEMENT OF SEN.
DECONcINI), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6521. See generally Woodward,
Exemptions, Opting Out, and Bankruptcy Reform, 43 Omo STATE L. J. 335, 336-44 (1982)
(discussing history and purposes of exemptions).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982). Under the Act, title to the debtor's property vests in the
estate and the trustee of the estate has the authority to dispose of the property. Id. §§ 363, 541;
see 4 COLLIER, supra note 1, 541.02, at 541-14. To protect property from creditors, debtors
must claim it as exempt after it has come into the estate. 4 COLLIER, supra note 1, 541.06, at
541-27.
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1982) (discharge of debts incurred prior to filing of bankruptcy
petition); id. § 704 (trustee's duty to liquidate property of estate); id. § 726 (distribution in
payment of debts); see also H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 125 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6087 (brief explanation of Chapter 7 process).
4. See Pickens v. Pickens, 125 Tex. 410, 414, 83 S.W.2d 951, 954 (1935) (exemption is
legally created right of debtor to protect portion of his property from claims of creditors). The
purpose of exemptions is to leave a debtor with enough resources to suDport himself and his
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their bankruptcy estates by listing the property in their exemption schedules.'
The Act provides federal exemptions but allows the individual states to
prohibit debtors from choosing these exemptions. 6 The Virginia legislature
has chosen to opt out of the federal exemption scheme and allow Virginia
debtors to claim only state law exemptions .7 A primary issue concerning
state law exemptions is whether debtors may claim state common law
exemptions in addition to state statutory exemptions. 8 In Tignor v. Parkinson9
the Fourth Circuit considered whether a debtor may amend his bankruptcy
exemption schedule and the extent to which the proceeds of a personal injury
settlement qualify for exemption under Virginia law.' 0
In Tignor, Henry Clay Tignor (the debtor) suffered injuries on November
9, 1978 while in the course of his employment and subsequently brought suit
against his employer under the Federal Employer's Liability Act." On August
18, 1980, the debtor filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy under Chapter
7 of the Act but did not include his personal injury claim or the anticipated
proceeds thereof in his exemption schedules.' 2 On September 24, 1980, the

dependants without public assistance. See Ulrich, Virginia's Exemption Statutes-the Need for
Reform and a Proposed Revision, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 127, 129-130 (1980). In addition
to providing for debtor self-support, exemptions enhance the debtor's chance of financial
rehabilitation. Id.; see In re Grindal, 30 B.R. 651, 653 (Bankr. D. Maine 1983) (goal of
exemption statutes is to enable debtor to support himself and family); Matter of Hersch, 23
B.R. 42, 45 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (purpose of exemption is to prevent family from becoming
public charge).
5. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982). A bankruptcy debtor must file a list of property he claims
as exempt. Id. § 522(1). The property claimed on the debtor's exemption schedule becomes
exempt absent an objection by a party in interest. Id.; see 3 COLLIER, supra note I, 522.26,
at 522-75 to 522-77 (explaining method of claiming exemptions).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982). In states that prohibit debtors from choosing federal
bankruptcy exemptions, debtors may claim federal nonbankruptcy exemptions and the exemptions of the debtor's state. Id. § 522(b)(2)(A). The Act specifically provides that a debtor may
exempt his interest in property held as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant to the extent such
property is exempt from creditor process under nonbankruptcy law. Id. § 522(b)(2)(B); see infra
notes 85-86 and accompanying text (implication of specific provision for tenant by entirety
exemption). The Act imposes no explicit minimum exemptions in states that have opted out.
See 3 COLLIER, supra note 1, 522.09, at 522-46.
7. VA. CODE § 34-3.1 (1984 Rep. Vol.); see In re White, 11 B.R. 775, 776 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1981) (upholding Virginia's opt out under § 522(b)). Virginia debtors in bankruptcy may
claim federal nonbankruptcy exemptions in addition to state exemptions. I1 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A)
(1982). Federal nonbankruptcy exemptions include, inter alia, social security payments, civil
service retirement benefits and veteran's benefits. See 3 COLLIER, supra note 1, 522.21, at 52268 to 522-69.
8. See infra notes 71-86 and accompanying text (examining validity of common law
exemptions in bankruptcy).
9. 729 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1984).
10. Id. at 978; see infra text accompanying notes 70-87 (discussion of exemptions under
Virginia law).
11. 729 F.2d at 978.
12. In re Tignor, 21 B.R. 219, 219 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982). In Tignor v. Parkinson, the
debtor listed debts in excess of $36,000. Id. Tignor claimed exemptions under Virginia Code
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trustee of the bankrupt estate held the first creditors meeting.' 3 The debtor
settled his personal injury claim on June 5, 198114 and amended his bankruptcy schedules to exempt the settlement proceeds on October 20, 1981.15
The trustee filed an objection to the debtor's amendments on October 30,
198 1,16 claiming that local rule 23(c) of the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia precluded the debtor from amending his exemption
schedules more than twenty days after the first creditor's meeting and that
Virginia law did not provide an exemption for personal injury claims or the
proceeds thereof.' 7 The trustee also claimed that the debtor could not amend
his exemption schedules to include the settlement proceeds because the
trustee, in reliance on the debtor's failure to claim proceeds as exempt, had
incurred expenses attempting to obtain the proceeds for the bankruptcy

estate. 18
The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia rejected the
trustee's objections and allowed the debtor to amend his exemption schedule.' 9 The bankruptcy court held that the proceeds of the debtor's personal

§34-4 and § 34-26 and § 522(b)(2)(B) of the Act. 729 F.2d at 978; see 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B)
(1982) (exemption for property held as tenant by entirety or joint tenant); VA. CODE § 34-26
(1984 Rep. Vol.) (enumerating articles debtor may exempt in addition to homestead property);
VA. CODE § 34-4 (1984 Rep. Vol.) (householder or head of family may exempt up to $5,000
worth of real and personal property).
13. 729 F.2d at 978. Section 341(a) of the Act calls for a meeting of creditors within a
reasonable time after the filing of a voluntary petition. 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) (1982). The primary
purpose of creditors meetings is to provide a forum for creditors to elect a trustee, question the
debtor to determine whether he has concealed or improperly disposed of assets, and offer advice
on the administration of the estate. 2 COLLIER, supra note 1, 341.01, at 341-3; see FED. R.
BANKR. 2003 (providing logistics of creditors meeting).
14. Tignor, 21 B.R. at 219. The debtor settled his claim for $150,000 but received only
$105,000 since $45,000 went for attorney's fees. Id.
15. Id. at 220. In Tignor, the debtor claimed his settlement was exempt by a combination
of § 522(b)(2)(A) of the Act and Virginia common law. 729 F.2d at 978. See 11 U.S.C. §
522(b)(2)(A) (allowing debtors to claim state law exemptions in bankruptcy); see also In re
Musgrove 7 B.R. 892, 896 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981) (under Virginia common law personal injury
claims exempt from creditors).
16. Tignor, 21 B.R. at 220.
17. 729 F.2d at 978-79. The trustee in Tignor argued that courts should not allow debtors
to amend their exemption schedules more than 20 days after the creditors meeting. Brief for
Appellant at 3-4, Tignor v. Parkinson, 729 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter cited as
Appellant's Brief]. The trustee urged that such a rule was necessary to insure that debtors would
not receive improper exemptions because exemptions become effective absent objection and
local rule 23(c) required objections within 20 days of the creditors meeting. Id. at 3-4; see
BANKR. E.D. VA. R. 23(c) (20 days in which to object to debtor's exemptions).
18. 729 F.2d at 979, Appellant's Brief, supra note 17, at 8-9. The trustee argued that if
the Tignor court did permit the amendment, the court should condition the amendment on the
debtor paying the expenses the trustee incurred in pursuit of the settlement proceeds. Appellant's
Brief, supra note 17, at 11; see In re Burgess, 1 B.R. 421, 426 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1979) (court
conditioned exemption schedule amendment on debtor's payment of trustee's expenses); see
also infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text (discussion of Tignor court's treatment of prejudice
claim).
19. Tignor, 21 B.R. at 220. The bankruptcy court in Tignor relied on bankruptcy rule
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injury settlement were exempt from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to

Virginia common law. 20 The trustee appealed the bankruptcy court's decision
to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and

the district court summarily affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. 2' The
trustee then appealed the district court's decision to the Fourth Circuit.?2
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to allow the debtor
to amend his exemption schedules but reversed the district court's holding
that exempted all of the settlement proceeds. 24 The Fourth Circuit remanded
the case to the district court with instructions to allow the debtor to exempt
his personal injury settlement only to the extent permitted under the Virginia

homestead exemption statute.?
The Fourth Circuit upheld the debtor's exemption schedule amendment
on the basis of bankruptcy rule 110, which provided that a debtor could
amend his schedules as a matter of course before the close of a case. 26 The
Tignor court stated that local rule 23(c), which required that all parties file
objections to exemptions within twenty days of the first creditors' meeting,
could not limit bankruptcy rule 110 by prohibiting debtors from amending

their exemption schedules more than twenty days after the first creditors'
meeting. 27 The Tignor court reasoned that bankruptcy rule 110 and local rule

23(c) were reconcilable to allow twenty days for objections to exemptions
110, which provided that a debtor could amend his schedules as a matter of course before the
close of a case. Id.; see FED. R. BANKca. 110; infra note 41 (cases allowing amendment of
exemption schedules). The bankruptcy court observed that local rule of court 23(c), which
provides that interested parties must file objections to the debtor's claimed exemptions within
20 days after the creditors meeting, could not limit the debtor's right to amend his bankruptcy
schedules under bankruptcy rule 110. 21 B.R. at 220. The Tignor bankruptcy court noted that
it possessed the equitable power to enlarge the time in which creditors must object to claimed
exemptions in order to avoid prejudice to creditor's rights. 21 B.R. at 220; see infra notes 4052 and accompanying text (other court's treatment of amendment and objections).
20. Tignor, 21 B.R. at 222. The Tignor bankruptcy court stated that debtors may claim
both statutory and common law exemptions under state law and noted that "exempt" as used
in § 522(b)(2)(A) of the Act means immune from creditor process. Id. at 220-21; see infra notes
71-86 and accompanying text (discussing common law exemptions). The bankruptcy court held
that personal injury causes of action are exempt from creditors in bankruptcy proceedings
because such causes of action are immune from creditor process under Virginia common law.
Tignor, 21 B.R. at 222.
21. Tignor, 729 F.2d at 978.
22. Id.
23. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 26-30 (Tignor court's rationale for allowing
exemption schedule amendment).
24. Tignor, 729 F.2d at 978; see infra notes 31-39 and accompanying text (Tignor court's
reasoning that personal injury claim exempt as part of $5,000 homestead exemption.)
25. 729 F.2d at 982; see infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (Tignor court's
construction of homestead exemption).
26. 729 F.2d at 979; see FED. R. BANIR. 110 (superseded by FED. R. BAJcN. 1009 (1983));
infra note 41 (cases allowing amendment of exemption schedules).
27. 729 F.2d at 979; see supra note 17 (trustee's argument that local rule 23(c) precluded
amendment).
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claimed by amendment. 28 The Fourth Circuit also rejected the trustee's
detrimental reliance objection to the debtor's amendment, 29 stating that the
trustee's position had not changed as a result of the debtor's failure to claim
the exemption earlier.30
In finding that the debtor's personal injury settlement was not entirely
exempt, the Fourth Circuit first considered whether a personal injury settlement is part of a bankruptcy estate. 31 The Tignor court observed that under
the Act all property of the debtor, including exempt property; becomes
property of the estate.3 2 The Tignor court observed further that proceeds of
estate property are also estate property.33 Viewing the debtor's personal
injury claim as property of the bankruptcy estate and the settlement recovery
28. 729 F.2d at 979. In deciding to allow the debtor to amend his exemption schedules
the Tignor court followed the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in Redmond v. Tuttle. Id.; see
Redmond v. Tuttle, 698 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1983). In Redmond, the debtors filed a joint
voluntary bankruptcy petition but failed to include their joint checking account balance in their
bankruptcy schedules. 698 F.2d at 415. More than 15 days after the first creditors meeting, the
trustee in Redmond learned of the debtors' checking account and recovered the account balance
for the bankruptcy estate. Id. The debtors claimed they had been unaware of the money in the
account and filed an amendment to their bankruptcy schedules to exempt the money. Id. The
trustee objected to the debtor's amendment, claiming that local rule 4004, which provided that
parties in interest must file objections to exemptions within 15 days of the first creditors
meeting, precluded amendment of exemption schedules more than 15 days after the creditors
meeting. Id. at 415-16. The trustee argued that to allow amendments to exemption schedules
more than 15 days after the creditors meeting would enable debtors to claim and receive
exemptions to which no one could object, because parties could not object to exemptions more
than 15 days after the creditors meeting and exemptions become effective absent objection. Id.
at 416. The Tenth Circuit rejected the trustee's argument holding that a debtor may claim newly
discovered property as exempt as a matter of course before a case is closed and that interested
parties have 15 days from the date of the amendment to object. Id. at 417 (citing In re Cobb,
3 B.R. 150, 151-52 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1980)) (fifteen day period for creditor to object to
amendment runs from date of amendment). The Redmond court noted that its decision was
consistent with proposed bankruptcy rule 4003. 698 F.2d at 417; See FED. R. BANKR. 4003(b)
(1983) (allowing 30 days from either creditors meeting or amendment to object).
29. See supra text accompanying note 17 (trustee's claim of detrimental reliance in Tignor).
30. 729 F.2d at 979. The Tignor court noted that the debtor's failure to claim the
personal injury exemption earlier did not affect the trustee's position because the trustee had
not taken any action toward obtaining the settlement proceeds until the debtor had settled his
claim. Id.; see infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (analysis of Tignor court's decision on
trustee's prejudice claim).
31. 729 F.2d at 979.
32. Id. at 980; see Shirkey v. Leake, 715 F.2d 859, 863 (4th Cir. 1983) (exempt property
included in estate); In re Mucelli, 21 B.R. 601, 604 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (personal injury
claim property of estate until exempted); 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982) (all legal or equitable
interests of debtor become part of estate). The Tignor court cited the legislative history of §
541, which states that the debtor's estate includes all property of the debtor, even that needed
for a fresh start. 729 F.2d at 980; see I1 U.S.C. § 541 (1982); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 125 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD. NEws 5787, 5868 (estate includes
property needed for fresh start); see also 4 COLLER, supra note 1, 541.10, at 541-64 (personal
injury actions are property of estate).
33. 729 F.2d at 980; see In re Mucelli, 21 B.R. 601, 604 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (future
proceeds of personal injury claims are proceeds in context of § 541); 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6)
(1982) (proceeds of estate property are estate property); 4 COLLIER, supra note 1, 541.19, at
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as a proceed of the claim, the Fourth Circuit found that the settlement was

property of the estate. 4
Having found the debtor's settlement proceeds to be part of the bankruptcy estate, the Tignor court considered the extent to which the debtor

could exempt the proceeds from the bankruptcy estate. 3 The Fourth Circuit
reasoned that the debtor could exempt the proceeds only to the extent that
Virginia law would permit because Virginia had opted out of the federal
exemption scheme, thereby limiting Virginia debtors to state law exemp-

tions. 6 Noting that debtors may claim only statutorily created exemptions,
as opposed to common law exemptions, the Tignor court decided that the

Virginia homestead exemption statute37 provides an exemption not to exceed
5,000 dollars for real and personal property, including unintentional tort
claims. 3 The Fourth Circuit concluded, therefore, that the debtor could
exempt his personal injury settlement proceeds only as part of the 5,000
39
dollar Virginia homestead exemption.

While the Fourth Circuit overruled the Tignor bankruptcy court concerning the scope of the debtor's personal injury exemption, both courts

agreed that a debtor may amend his exemption schedules when such amendment is not prejudicial to adverse parties.40 Other federal circuit courts, as
well as bankruptcy courts in other circuits, are in accord with the Fourth
Circuit in Tignor and allow amendment of exemption schedules absent

prejudice to adverse parties. 4' In In re Vest, for example, the Bankruptcy

541-94 (proceeds intended as broad term encompassing all proceeds of estate property).
34. 729 F.2d at 981. The Tignor court noted that the provision in the federal exemptions
for personal injury claims indicates that such claims are included in the estate. Id. at 980; see
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(l1)(D) (1982) ($7,500 exemption for proceeds of personal injury claims).
35. 729 F.2d at 981; see infra notes 58-86 and accompanying text (discussing extent of
personal injury exemption).
36. 729 F.2d at 981; see supra note 6 (effect of state's opting out).
37. See VA. CODE § 34-4 (1984). The Virginia homestead exemption states:
Exemption created. -Every householder or head of a family residing in this
State shall be entitled, in addition to the property or estate which he is entitled to
hold exempt from levy, distress or garnishment under §§ 34-26, 34-27 and 34-29, to
hold exempt from levy, seizure, garnishment or sale under any execution, order or
process issued on any demand for a debt or liability on contract, his real and personal
property, or either, to be selected by him, including money and debts due him, to
the value of not exceeding $5,000. The word "debt," as used in this title shall be
construed to include a liability incurred as the result of an unintentional tort.
id.; cf. notes 72-86 and accompanying text (discussing existence of common law exemptions in
bankruptcy).
38. 729 F.2d at 981; see VA. CODE § 34-4 (1984) ($5,000 homestead exemption); infra
notes 58-72 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's interpretation of §34-4 and
common law exemptions in bankruptcy).
39. 729 F.2d at 982.
40. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing Tignor bankruptcy court's
decision to permit amendment); notes 29-30 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's
reasoning on amendment).
41. See Doan v. Hudgins, 672 F.2d 831, 833 (11th Cir. 1982). The Eleventh Circuit in
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Court for the District of New Mexico allowed a debtor to amend his
exemption schedules to include a television set when the trustee had taken

no action to recover the television.4 2 The Vest court stated that amendment

would not adversely affect any party to the action because no party had
expended time or money to recover the property for the estate.4 1 Courts
agree, however, that debtors may not amend their exemption schedules to
exempt property after the trustee has expended time or money to recover

that property for the bankruptcy estate. 44 In In re Selman, for example, the

Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico denied the debtors' attempt
to amend their exemption schedules to protect real estate that the trustee
already had sold on behalf of the bankruptcy estate.4 5 The Selman court
noted that approval of the amendment would be unfair to the trustee because
he already had expended effort to sell the property.4
Although the Tignor court purported to follow the rule that courts
should allow amendments to exemption schedules only in the absence of
prejudice to adverse parties,47 the court considered the wrong time period in
48
rejecting the trustee's claim that amendment would be prejudicial to him.
The Tignor court observed that the trustee had taken no action to recover
the personal injury claim for the estate until the debtor settled the claim on
Doan allowed the debtors to amend their exemption schedule to exempt a tax refund eleven
months after the initial creditors meeting. Id. at 832. The Doan court held that courts had no
discretion to deny debtors' amendments before the close of a case except in instances of debtor
bad faith or prejudice to creditors. Id. at 833; accord Redmond v. Tuttle, 698 F.2d 414, 41617 (10th Cir. 1983) (court permitted amendment of exemption schedule to include newly
discovered assets before case closed); Andermahr v. Barrus, 30 B.R. 532, 534 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1983) (court must allow amendment absent prejudice to other parties); In re Davis 38 B.R. 585,
586-87 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (overwhelming weight of authority allows amendment before
close of case); In re Kochell, 23 B.R. 191, 192 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982) (same); In re McQueen,
21 B.R. 736, 738 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982) (courts should allow amendment absent detrimental
reliance or prejudice to adverse parties); In re Brock, 10 B.R. 67, 69 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981)
(courts should allow amendment where no detrimental reliance by adverse parties); see also In
re Gershenbaum, 598 F.2d 779, 781 (3d Cir. 1979) (court has no discretion to deny amendment).
42. In re Vest, 18 B.R. 241, 242 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1980).
43. Id.

44. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (discussing cases that disallowed amendment because of probable prejudice to trustee).
45. In re Selman, 7 B.R. 889, 890 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1980). The debtors in Selman claimed
a state exemption for their house in Albuquerque in their original bankruptcy petition. Id. at
889; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-10-9 (1978) (New Mexico homestead exemption). Five months
after the debtors in Selman made their initial exemption election and after the trustee had sold
the debtors' unprotected Utah real estate, the debtors attempted to change their exemption
claim from state to federal and exempt the Utah property under § 522(d) of the Act. 7 B.R. at
889; see 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1982) (federal bankruptcy exemptions).
46. 7 B.R. at 890. The Selman court noted that § 326 of the Act would prohibit the trustee
from receiving any compensation for his efforts in selling the Utah property if the court were
to allow the debtor's amendment. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 326 (1982) (trustee not entitled to
compensation for liquidating exempt property).
47. 729 F.2d at 979.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 49-51 (discussing Tignor court's treatment of
trustee's detrimental reliance claim).
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June 5, 1981 . 49 The debtor, however, did not amend his exemption schedule

until October 21, 1981.50 Thus, the Tignor court ignored a nearly five month
period during which the trustee may have expended effort to recover the
settlement proceeds for the bankruptcy estate."
Regardless of whether the Fourth Circuit correctly determined that the

exemption schedule amendment would not be prejudicial to the trustee, the
Tignor court's decision to allow the amendment appears to be in direct
violation of Virginia statutory law.52 Prior to Tignor, the Fourth Circuit held
in Zimmerman v. Morgan that a debtor in bankruptcy proceedings must
comply with state law procedures to claim state exemptions. 3 Virginia Code
section 34-17 provides that a debtor may not claim property as exempt under
the homestead exemption 54 after he files his voluntary petition in bankruptcy. 5 Because the Tignor court held that the debtor's personal injury

49. 729 F.2d at 979.

50. Id. at 980.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50 (time period Tignor court considered). On
August 26, 1981, the Tignor bankruptcy court approved the trustee's employment of counsel to
obtain the personal injury settlement proceeds for the bankruptcy estate. Appellant's Brief,
supra note 17, at 2. The trustee in Tignor asserted that the estate incurred legal fees by engaging
in negotiations for the proceeds of the personal injury settlement. Id. at 9. The debtor asserted
that the record in Tignor did not indicate that the trustee took action to assert the bankruptcy
estate's claim to the settlement proceeds or that negotiations took place. Brief for Appellee at
1, Tignor v. Parkinson 729 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1984). The suggestion that the trustee failed to
include evidence of prejudice to his position in the record does not alter the fact that the Fourth
Circuit considered the wrong time period in evaluating the trustee's detrimental reliance claim.
52. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (discussing VA. CODE § 34-17).
53. See Zimmerman v. Morgan, 689 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1982). The debtor in Zimmerman
filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy and recorded a description of the property he claimed
as exempt in order to claim the Virginia homestead exemption. Id. at 472. The debtor mistakenly
recorded the description in the wrong county. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that when a debtor
claims state law exemptions in bankruptcy he must comply with state law exemption procedures
and the debtor's failure to satisfy Virginia's procedural requirements precluded him from
claiming the homestead exemption. Id.; see White v. Stump, 266 U.S. 310, 314 (1924) (Idaho
debtor denied homestead exemption in bankruptcy for failure to comply with procedure of state
statute); In re Norton, 30 B.R. 713, 715 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983) (debtor's failure to satisfy
procedure of Tennessee law precluded debtor's claim of exemption).
54. VA. CODE § 34-4 (1984); see supra note 37 (text of § 34-4).
55. VA. CODE § 34-17 (1984). Virginia Code § 34-17 states:
When the exception may be set apart. - The real or personal estate which a
householder is entitled to hold as exempt may be set apart at any time before it is
subjected by sale or otherwise under judgment, decree, order, execution or other legal
process, provided that (1) any person who files a voluntary petition in bankruptcy
may set it apart before or on the same day that he files his petition but not thereafter,
or (2) any person against whom an involuntary petition in bankruptcy is filed may
set it apart at any time before the expiration of the period after its adjudication
within which he is required to file his schedule. (emphasis added).
Id.
In In re Collins, the debtors attempted to amend their exemption schedule to include
anticipated income tax refunds. 24 B.R. 485, 486 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982). The bankruptcy
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settlement qualified for exemption only under the Virginia homestead exemption,5 6 section 34-17 should have applied to bar the debtor's attempt to
amend his exemption schedules after he filed his voluntary petition in
s7
bankruptcy.
One commentator has speculated that, despite the command of section
34-17, fairness dictated allowing the debtor to amend his exemption schedule
because Tignor stated a novel doctrine of law concerning the exempt status
of personal injury causes of action 8 Since the Tignor court held that section
34-4 of the Virginia Code provides the only exemption for personal injury
claims, denial of the amendment would have precluded the debtor from
protecting any of his settlement proceeds. s9 By granting the exemption, the
purpose of which is to promote a fresh start, the Tignor court furthered the
fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy CodeA0
court in Collins adopted the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in Zimmerman v. Morgan and
held that Virginia Code § 34-17 precludes debtors from amending their homestead exemption
deeds after the debtor files a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. Id. at 487; see supra note 53
(discussing Zimmerman).
56. 729 F.2d at 982.
57. See supra note 55 (text of § 34-17); see also In re Sutphin, 24 B.R. 149, 150 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1982) (§ 34-17 precluded debtor from amending homestead deed to exempt previously
unmentioned tax refund); In re Burns, 23 B.R. 987, 987 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982) (§ 34-17
precluded debtor from amending bankruptcy schedules after filing voluntary petition). The
Fourth Circuit's decision in Shirkey v. Leake does not alter the concluion that § 34-17 bars
amendment of a homestead deed to include previously unclaimed property. See Shirkey v.
Leake, 715 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1983). In Shirkey, the debtor mistakenly claimed his 1980 income
tax refunds on his homestead deed as 1978 refunds. 715 F.2d at 860; see VA. CODE § 34-14
(1984) (debtor must file homestead deed to claim exemptions). The Fourth Circuit in Shirkey,
noting that the date of the refunds served no critical purpose, allowed the debtor to amend his
homestead deed to correct the date of the refunds. 715 F.2d at 863. The Shirkey court stated
that § 34-17 does not prohibit amendments that clarify exemptions the debtor already has
claimed. Id. Judge Widener concurred in Shirkey on the ground that the debtor's initial
description had described the exemption adequately. Id. at 864 (Widener, C.J., concurring). In
contrast to the facts in Shirkey, the debtor in Tignor attempted to exempt his personal injury
settlement for the first time by amending his exemption schedules. 729 F.2d at 978.
58. See Ulrich, How Bankruptcy Exemptions Work: Virginia as an Illustration of Why
the "Opt Out" Clause was a Bad Idea, GEO. MASON L. Rav. (1985) (in depth criticism of
Tignor court's interpretation of § 34-4); see infra notes 61-86 and accompanying text (discussing
Tignor court's novel treatment of exempt status of personal injury claims).
59. 729 F.2d at 981. The debtor in Tignor claimed the homestead exemption but did not
include any of his personal injury claim as part of the exemption. Id. at 978. In light of the
fact that no other court had extended § 34-4 to personal injury recoveries it would have been
unreasonable for the Tignor court to expect the debtor to claim his personal injury cause of
action as part of his homestead exemption. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (other
courts' interpretations of § 34-4).
60. See Tignor, 729 F.2d 977. Since the goal of exemption statutes is to permit debtors
to protect certain property, allowing amendment to protect that property serves the goal. See
supra note 4 (goal of exemptions); see also Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C.L.REv. 769, 800 (1980) (debtors should not lose exemptions
for failure to claim them). Allowing debtors to amend their exemption schedules absent prejudice
to adverse parties also is consistent with the almost universally accepted rule that courts should
construe exemption statutes liberally for the benefit of the debtor. See In re Smith, 640 F.2d
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After deciding to allow the debtor to amend his exemption schedule, the
Tignor court reached the unprecedented conclusion that Virginia debtors
may protect their personal injury claims only as part of the 5,000 dollar
Virginia homestead exemption. 6' In 1978, the Virginia legislature amended
the Virginia homestead exemption by adding a definition of the word
"debt. ' 62 The amendment defines debt as including a "liability incurred as
the result of an unintentional tort."' 63 The word "debt" appears twice in the
section, first as "debt" and then as "debts." 64 In the first instance debt
refers to creditor's claims against the debtor against which the debtor may
assert the homestead exemption. 6 In the second instance "debts due him"
refers to payments third parties owe to the debtor which the homestead
exemption protects from the claims of the debtor's creditors. 6 6 The Tignor
court stated that the 1978 amendment applied to both the word "debt" and
the word "debts" in section 34-4.67 The Tignor court's interpretation of
section 34-4 is awkward because it contemplates a bankruptcy petitioner
protecting "liabilities incurred as the result of an unintentional tort due
68
him."
The Tignor court's interpretation of section 34-4, in addition to being
awkward, is inconsistent with the holdings of other courts in the Fourth
Circuit.6 9 In In re Musgrove, for example, the Bankruptcy Court for the
888, 891 (7th Cir. 1981) (construe exemption statutes liberally); Murray v. Zuke, 408 F.2d 483,
487 (8th Cir. 1969) (liberally construe exemption statutes for relief of debtor and family); Elliott
v. Ostman, 340 F.2d 581, 583 (9th Cir. 1965) (construe exemption statute liberally).
61. 729 F.2d at 982; see infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (other courts' interpretation of § 34-4). See generally Ulrich, supra note 58 (in depth criticism of Tignor court's
interpretation of § 34-4).
62. See VA. CODE § 34-4 (1984).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 729 F.2d at 981.
68. See VA. CODE § 34-4 (1984). An alternative interpretation of §34-4 would apply the
definition of debt to the word as it first appears in the section but not in the second instance.
Such an interpretation would read more naturally, because it would contemplate debtors
protecting $5,000 of their property from their creditors' demands, including demands against
the debtor for his unintentional torts. While Professor Ulrich concedes that the Tignor court's
interpretation of § 34-4 is possible he emphasizes that it is not idiomatic. Ulrich, supra note 58.
69. See Tignor, 21 B.R. at 221 (no Virginia statute explicitly exempts personal injury
claims). In In re Eanes, which arose after the amendment to § 34-4, the Bankruptcy Court for
the Western District of Virginia stated that title 34 of the Virginia Code provides no exemption
for personal injury claims and therefore held the debtor could not exempt his personal injury
claim. In re Eanes, No. 682-00157-C, slip op. at 3 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1982). In Eanes v.
Shepherd, the District Court for the Western District of Virginia reversed the bankruptcy court
and held that personal injury claims are exempt under Virginia common law. Eanes v. Shepherd,
33 B.R. 984, 987 (W.D. Va. 1983). Unlike the Fourth Circuit in Tignor, neither the Eanes
bankruptcy court nor the Eanes district court applied § 34-4 to the debtor's personal injury
exemption claim. Following the Tignor decision, however, the Fourth Circuit reversed the Eanes
decision. 735 F.2d 1354 (4th Cir. 1984). See also Woodward, supra note 1, (listing Virginia
among states having no statutory personal injury exemption).
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Western District of Virginia relied on Virginia common law to determine the
existence of an exemption for personal injury claims. 70 The Musgrove court's
reliance on the common law rather than section 34-4 implies that, unlike the
Tignor court, the Musgrove court did not believe section 34-4 applied to
debtor's personal injury claims.
The Tignor court, in support of its interpretation of section 34-4, stated
that exemptions are strictly statutory.7 1 Other courts are not in agreement
over whether debtors may claim only statutorily created exemptions in
bankruptcy. 72 The Tignor court's statement conflicts, for example, with the
recent decision of the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
in Matter of Brandstaetter.7 The Brandstaetter court held that despite the
absence of a statutory exemption, personal injury claims are exempt in
bankruptcy under Wisconsin common law. 74 The Brandstaetter court stated
that debtors may claim common law exemptions in bankruptcy under section
522(b)(2)(A) of the Act. 75 The decision of the Musgrove court is also in
conflict with the Tignor court's statement that exemptions are strictly statutory. 76 In Musgrove, the bankruptcy court found that the entirety of a
77
debtor's unliquidated personal injury claim constituted exempt property.

70. In re Musgrove 7 B.R. 892, 896 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981). In Musgrove, the bankruptcy
court found that the entirety of a debtor's unliquidated personal injury claim constituted exempt
property. Id. at 896. The Musgrove court relied on Virginia common law, which provided that
unliquidated claims are exempt because they are neither assignable nor subject to creditor
process. Id.; see Ruebush v. Funk, 63 F.2d 170, 173 (4th Cir. 1933) (personal injury claim not
assignable); City of Richmond v. Hanes, 203 Va. 102, 105, 122 S.E.2d 895, 898 (1961) (personal
injury claim not transferable). Although the Tignor bankruptcy court followed the Musgrove
decision, the Fourth Circuit in Tignor did not address the significance of Musgrove. See 21
B.R. 219, 222-23 (Tignor bankruptcy court followed Musgrove); see also 729 F.2d 977 (holding
that common law exemptions are inapplicable).
71. 729 F.2d at 981-82.
72. See infra notes 73-81 and accompanying text (discussing sources of exemption). Courts
often state that exemptions are strictly statutory, without providing any explanation for the
rule. See, e.g., Nohinek v. Logsdon, 6 Kan. App. 2d 342, 343, 628 P.2d 257, 258 (1981)
(exemptions are not common law rights but are creations of statutes and constitutions); Richman
v. Pratt, 174 N.J. Super. 1, 414 A.2d 1371, 1372 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (general
rule is that exemptions are created by statute or constitution); State v. Caldwell, 181 Tenn. 74,
85, 178 S.W.2d 624, 628 (1944) (exemption must appear in constitution or statute); In re Yoder's
Estate, 341 Pa. 81, 82, 19 A.2d 139, 140 (1941) (exemption must be statutory); Medical Finance
Ass'n. v. Short, 36 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 745, 746, 92 P.2d 961, 962 (Cal. 1969) (exemption must
be statutory).
73. 36 B.R. 369 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1984). In In re Brandstaetter, the debtors claimed
Wisconsin common law exemptions for personal injury claims on which they had not yet filed
suit. Id. at 369. The Brandstaettercourt, without giving any reason, simply agreed with the
debtor's claim that state common law exemptions are effective in bankruptcy. Id. at 369-70.
74. Id. at 370.
75. Id.
76. See Musgrove, 7 B.R. 892. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (Musgrove
court's application of common law exemptions in bankruptcy).
77. 7 B.R. at 896.
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The Musgrove court stated that under Virginia common law personal injury

causes of action are immune from creditor process and therefore are exempt
78
in bankruptcy pursuant to section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Act.
The Fourth Circuit's view that exemptions are strictly statutory is in
accord, however, with the holding of the Bankruptcy Court for the Western

District of Virginia in In re Dummit.79 The debtor in Dummit attempted to
exempt his automobile under section 34-26 of the Virginia Code, which

provides that a mechanic may exempt the tools of his trade. s0 While the
Dummit court noted that the debtor's automobile was essential to his work
as a travelling salesman, the court held that a debtor may only exempt items
the Virginia Code expressly permits and since a travelling salesman's automobile is not literally the tool of a mechanic's trade, the exemption did not

apply.81 The Dummit court's decision, therefore, is consistent with the Tignor
court's statement that exemptions are strictly statutory.

Similar to the conflict among the courts, commentators also do not agree

whether debtors may claim common law exemptions in bankruptcy.8 2 One
commentator specifically disagrees with the Tignor court's statement that

exemptions are strictly statutory, noting that the phrase "state or local law"
generally includes both statutory and common law. 3 Another commentator,
however, has stated that the status of common law exemptions in bankruptcy
is unclear. 84 Professor Woodward notes that the Bankruptcy Act's specific
provision of exemptions for tenancy by entirety property and spendthrift
trusts, which are often immune from creditor process under state common

law, implies that state common law exemptions do not apply in bankruptcy.

5

78. Id. The Fourth Circuit's treatment of both the Tignor and Eanes cases indicates that
the Fourth Circuit does not follow the Musgrove decision. See 729 F.2d 977 (Tignor decision);
735 F.2d 1354 (Eanesdecision).
79. In re Dummit, 2 B.R. 136 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980); see infra text accompanying notes
80-81 (Dummit court's reasoning that debtor may claim only statutory exemptions).
80. Dummit, 2 B.R. at 137; see VA. CODE § 34-26 (1984) (exemption for mechanic's tools
of trade).
81. Dummit, 2 B.R. at 137. The Dummit -court held that Virginia's opt out statute
required that debtors claim only those exemptions specified in title 34 of the Virginia Code.
Id.; see VA. CODE § 34-3.1 (Virginia's opt out statute); Woodward, supra note 69, at 346 (listing
Virginia among states having opt out statutes which restrict debtors to statutory exemptions).
82. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (discussing commentator's different
views).
83. See Ulrich, supra note 58. Professor Ulrich cites ErieRailroadv. Thompson, in which
the Supreme Court held that in the absence of federal constitutional or statutory law federal
courts must apply state law, whether statutorily or judicially created. Id. see Erie Railroad v.
Thompson, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). While the legislative history of § 522(B)(2)(A) is silent on
the meaning of "state or local law," Congress must have been aware of the general understanding of the phrase.
84. See Woodward, supra note 69, at 350; see infra text accompanying notes 85-86
(discussing implication of Bankruptcy Reform Act's specific provisions for tenant by entirety
and spendthrift trust exemptions).
85. Woodward, supra note 69, at 351; see 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1982) (tenancy by
entirety exemption); id. § 541(c)(2) (spendthrift trust exemptions).
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If the reference to state or local law in section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Act
included state common law exemptions, then specific provisions for these
two types of exemptions would be unnecessary because both these types of

s6
property would already be exempt under section 522(b)(2)(A).
In view of the Fourth Circuit's belief that debtors may claim only

statutory exemptions in bankruptcy the Tignor court's interpretation of
section 34-4 of the Virginia Code served to promote the debtor's fresh start
87
by allowing the debtor to protect at least part of his settlement recovery.
In light of the disagreement among courts and commentators on the status

of common law exemptions in bankruptcy, however, the Tignor court's belief
that debtors may claim only statutory exemptions appears debatable.18 To
the extent, therefore, that the Fourth Circuit's belief that exemptions are
strictly statutory influenced the Tignor court's unprecedented 9 and awkward

interpretation of the Virginia homestead exemption, that interpretation is
subject to question.90
While the Tignor court allowed the debtor to amend his exemption
schedules, practitioners should remain aware that the clear mandate of section

34-17 probably will bar Virginia debtors from amending their exemption
schedules in the future. 9' The Tignor decision also should alert practitioners
86. Woodward, supra note 69, at 351. But see Ulrich, supra note 58 (Act's provision of
common law tenancy by entirety exemption does not imply inapplicability of other common
law exemptions).
87. See Tignor, 729 F.2d at 981. Had the Tignor court interpreted § 34-4 as not including
personal injury recoveries, the debtor could not have protected any of the proceeds of his
settlement. Id. at 982. In addition to promoting a fresh start the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Tignor also served the goal of the Virginia opt out statute by enabling the debtor to protect the
same property in bankruptcy as he would have been able to protect under purely state
proceedings. See Woodward, supra note 69, at 346 (apparent intent of opt out statutes is to
leave debtors with same property after bankruptcy as they would have retained after state debt
collection proceedings); Ulrich, supra note 58 (Tignor result possibly correct in giving exemption
claim same treatment in bankruptcy as claim would get in state creditor proceedings); see also
VA. CODE § 34-3.1 (1984) (Virginia's opt out statute). State common law personal injury claim
exemptions are effective only while the claims remain unliquidated because once the debtor
recovers on the claim the proceeds are assignable and thus subject to creditor process except to
the extent that the debtor can protect the proceeds under an exemption statute. When bankruptcy
courts allow these common law exemptions in bankruptcy, however, the exemptions become
final via the debtor's discharge. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (explanation of Chapter
7 bankruptcy procedures). Therefore, by permitting the debtor to except his personal injury
claim proceeds only under a statutory exemption the Tignor court allowed the debtor to protect
the same property in bankruptcy as he could have protected under state proceedings.
88. See supra notes 72-86 and accompanying text (discussing unsettled status of common
law exemptions in bankruptcy). Had the Tignor court held that common law exemptions do
apply in bankruptcy the court would have provided the debtor with a much more meaningful
fresh start by enabling the debtor to retain all $105,000 of his settlement rather than just parl
of the settlement not to exceed $5,000. See In re Musgrove, 7 B.R. 892, 896 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
1981) (debtor may exempt entire unliquidated personal injury claim under common law).
89. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (no other court has interpreted § 34-4
as applying to personal injury claims).
90. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text (discussing Tignor court's awkward
interpretation of § 34-4).
91. See Ulrich, supra note 58. Because the Tignor decision serves as a warning that § 34-4

